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Abstract: This paper comments on mortgage procyclicality. A framework for credit 
constraints along the lines of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) illustrates the potential regime 
shift in the credit risk assessments of mortgagees. Depending on the relationship between 
house price growth and the alternative rate of return the weight given to collateral and 
debt-servicing ability may vary according to the house price cycle as mortgagees engage 
in search-for-yield. Regime shifts might come about when house price appreciation is 
expected and risk assessments ignore debt-servicing ability, fuelled by competition for 
mortgage market shares and expansionary monetary policy. In the case of regime shifts 
increased house price growth might stimulate owner-occupation and LTV-ratios and 
induce mortgage procyclicality.  
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    1. Introduction 
Stylised facts show how economic booms are associated with excessive lending, while 
downturns often are accompanied by credit crunches. This procyclicality can be related to 
a number of arguments, ranging from over-optimism (Herring and Wachter, 2002), 
reductions in supervisory toughness (Berger, Kyle and Scalise, 2001) or market discipline 
(Sironi, 2003), herding (Rajan, 1994), loan seasoning (Avery and Gordy, 1995) or the 
institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and Udell, 2004).  
 
This comment develops a simple model of mortgage procyclicality which can serve as a 
unified framework for the arguments above. The risk evaluations of mortgagees 
encompass assessments of both collateral and the debt-servicing ability of the mortgage 
seeker (Sommervoll et al, 2010). This paper shows why the importance of collateral 
(debt-servicing ability) might increase (decrease) as house prices grow, and argues for a 
potential regime shift in the relation between mortgage and housing markets.  
 
A model of housing demand that highlights the user cost of housing, the down-payment 
constraint and mortgagees’ relative rate of return is developed. The housing market 
adaption of credit constrained households is analyzed when the risk assessments of 
mortgagees are influenced by housing market conditions. Market influence is - directly or 
indirectly - common to the arguments above. As housing markets are characterized by 
adaptive expectations (Getzlaff, 1994), regime shifts can come about when house price 
growth stimulates expectations about future price growth and creates incentives for 
search-for-yield among mortgagees. Implicitly, the comment highlights the importance of 
including both debt-servicing ability and collateral values in the credit risk assessment of 
mortgagees in order to reduce procyclicality.    
 
The model provides a rational for why increased house price growth is accompanied by 
higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, as the regime shift allows new socio-economic groups 
to enter housing markets along the lines of Chambers et al (2009). Increased LTV-ratios 
make housing markets more exposed to shocks (Benito, 2006), and impact on how 
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housing markets respond to monetary policy. Changes in the monetary policy response 
make the financial accelerator in housing markets context specific (Calza, 2009).1
   
    
This comment is structured as follows. The second part sets out a model of housing 
demand by credit constrained households, focusing on the user cost of capital, liquidity 
constraints and down-payment conditions. The third part derives four regimes for 
mortgage structures and the housing market adaption of credit constrained households 
based on mortgagees incentives for search-for-yield. The last part concludes.   
  
  2. Credit constrained households   
For mortgage financed housing it is often necessary for a household to pledge collateral 
in the house that is to be purchased. For a number of reasons mortgagees also apply 
down-payment constraints (Engelhardt, 1996). Finally, risk score models involve a 
weighing of agent specific factors mainly related to debt-servicing ability. In basic, 
mortgage financed housing is conditional on both past, present and forecasted house 
prices, as well as the size of down payments and socio-economic characteristics of the 
mortgage seeker (Sommervoll et al, 2010). 
 
When incorporating debt-servicing ability, collateral and down-payments a household’s 
housing demand can be derived as follows: First of all, a collateral effect is introduced 
along the lines of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997):      
                1t1tt )r1(kqb
−
+ +=     when    1tt qq +< ,                                     (1) 
 
where 1+tq  is the house price in period t+1, r  is a fixed interest rate, tb  household debt 
and tk  housing capital, both in period t. The endogenous credit constraint in (1) assumes 
that lenders are myopic and only care about next period return. The collateral constraint 
allows a household a maximum level of debt equal to the present value of the (expected) 
market value of collateral, as some sluggishness is assumed in the default process. To 
simplify, house price growth is assumed exogenous.  
                                                 
1 See Bernanke et al (1996) for financial accelerators, and Aoki et al (2004) for an application to housing markets. 
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Second, a liquidity constraint can highlight debt-servicing ability, for instance as    
                                             tt
B
1tttttt Iq)r(1bCpbNw +++=+ −                                (2) 
 
Aggregate expenditures is split between consumption ttCp , interest payments and 
repayments of existing debt )1(1
B
t rb +− , and housing investments tt Iq . The mortgage 
interest rate, which also is fixed, is given by Br . Available funds are given by labor 
income tt Nw  and mortgage debt. As no depreciation is assumed, investments tI  equal 
the period’s increase in housing capital stock 1−−= ttt kkI . Savings is defined as income 
less consumption ttttt CpNwS −= . 
 
Inserting the collateral effect, and the expressions for investments and savings into (2), 
simplifies the liquidity constraint to      
                                     ( )1tttB1t1t1tt kkq)r(1b)r1(kqS −−−+ −++=++ .                               (3) 
Rearranging, and solving for housing demand, gives   
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where 





+
− +
r
qq tt 1
1 equals the user cost of capital and ( )[ ])1 11 ttBtt qkrbS −− ++−  net worth 
(NW) of a household. The latter is defined as current savings plus the market value of 
existing housing less interest and repayments on existing debt. Whereas net worth 
represents a household’s potential down-payment, the reciprocal of the user cost 
measures the necessary down-payment pr. unit of mortgage financed housing. In this 
simplified expression of the user cost the necessary down-payment only depends on the 
expected capital gain (loss) of owner-occupied housing, which also is the key component 
of the endogenous credit constraint.2
                                                 
2 In a more thorough analysis, as for instance by Haurin and Gill (2002), the user cost contains six elements: interest 
rate, the rate of depreciation, repair, insurance costs, property taxes and the capital gain.  
 Hence, housing demand depends on a market based 
down-payment constraint and a household’s financial position.  
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3. Mortgage policy and search-for-yield 
In order to analyse how a credit constrained household adapts to housing markets the 
lending policy of a mortgagee must be introduced. A mortgage policy taking collateral 
and debt-servicing ability into account and which is in conformity with our model reads:3
                  
  
[ ]( ))(1bCpNwα,)r(1kqαminb 1ttttt11t1t2*t r+−−+= −−+                             (5)      
 
where *tb  is the maximum level of debt a household is allowed given the risk assessments 
of the mortgagee. Debt is constrained by:  
• The accepted LTV-ratio 2α , defined in terms of the present value of collateral.  
• The accepted debt-to-income ratio 1α , (measuring debt-servicing ability). Debt-to-
income is given for a situation where households refinance all debt each period 
and income adjusted for necessary consumption expenditures.  
 
Further, we assume that the mortgagee has two alternative investment possibilities; in the 
mortgage market or in an alternative asset where the return equals the interest rate. The 
relative rate of return impacts on both mortgagees’ aggregate housing market exposure 
and the accompanying mortgage structures it allows.   
 
The exogenous interest rate equals the alternative rate of return. Together with a 
mortgage spread, the interest rate also determines the mortgage rate and is crucial for 
mortgagees’ nominal return.4
                                                 
3  See for instance again Chambers et al (2009) for developments in mortgage structures and their implications.  
 House price growth - and the accompanying collateral 
effect - is first of all gross mortgage return in case of default. Second, through its 
interdependence with mortgage markets house price growth also impacts on mortgagees’ 
incentives for search-for-yield. In addition to fuelling current lending house price growth 
also boosts bank capital by increasing the value of the collateral pledged by existing 
borrowers (Koetter and Poghosyan, 2009). The reduction in portfolio risk accompanying 
house price growth might impact on both funding costs and capital adequacy ratios, and 
4 A mortgage spread can as in Gallagher and Milne (1997) either be defined a retail mortgage spread, measured as the 
difference between mortgage interest and the interest rate, or as a wholesale mortgage spread defined as the mortgage 
rate minus the cost of wholesale funds.  
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serve as a basis for future lending. Stated differently, the interplay between house price 
growth and increased mortgages volumes may allow mortgagees to compensate for a 
reduction in mortgage spread following a fall in interest rate by increased lending and 
growth in the mortgage net-interest rate or the mortgage margin to meet a nominal return 
target (Rajan, 2005). This process is in the following referred to as search-for-yield.  
 
We relate the incentive for search-for-yield among mortgagees to the difference between 
the alternative return and house price growth: 
                                                  ( )r1+  vs 




 +
t
1t
q
q
                                                            (6)   
In Heuson et al (2001) house price growth – measuring mortgage return in case of default 
exclusively – is assumed to be lower than the mortgage alternative return. Sommervoll et 
al (2010) on the other hand, allows for equality between the two.   
 
In the following we do not impose any restrictions on the relation between the two, and 
allow the mortgage return to exceed its alternative. It is the latter scenario which provides 
incentives for search-for-yield among mortgagees.  
 
Mortgagees may allow favorable developments in market risk (collateral) to compensate 
for unfavorable developments in socio-economic risks (debt-servicing ability) in overall 
risk assessments if house price appreciation is expected and the mortgage return exceeds 
its alternative, i.e. ( )
t
t
q
qr 11 +<+ . A mortgagee is now willing to suppress 1α  as a 
mortgage constraint, in order to increase its market exposure which again will allow for 
changes in mortgage structures.    
 
Expression (6) shows that in addition to developments in both mortgage markets and in 
the real side of the economy boosting house prices, a reduction in interest rate can also 
stimulate the risk taking of banks. This latter effect is, along the lines of Brunnermeier 
(2001) and Borio and Zhu (2008), arguing for increased risk taking both through changes 
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in behavior and through new ways of measuring risk respectively, in a low interest rate 
environment.  
 
4. Market based risk assessments, mortgage lending and house price growth regimes  
Expression (4) allows us to distinguish between four regimes for housing demand, 
separated by the rate of house price growth and the user cost of housing. The regimes are 
summarised in Table (-1-). Regime IV is impossible when the interest rate is positive, and 
is therefore ignored.5
 
  
Table 1: House prices and the user cost of housing  
 Growing house prices   Falling house prices   
 Positive user cost   I II 
Negative user cost   III   IV 
 
Regime (I) is referred to as a situation with weak house price growth and is characterised 
by a combination of house price growth 1+< tt qq  and a positive user cost of housing 
0
1
1 >





+
− +
r
qq tt . Combined, these two makes the regime characterised by: ( )
t
t
q
qr 11 +>+ .  
Likewise, in regime (II) house prices are falling 1+> tt qq  and the user cost is 
positive 0
1
1 >





+
− +
r
qq tt . Again, the combined constraint equals: ( )
t
t
q
qr 11 +>+ . In both 
these regimes is the mortgage return lower than its alternative. As the search-for-yield 
condition is not fulfilled conventional credit risk assessments dominate lending. 
 
Expression (7) shows that when the user cost is positive, a household is allowed to enter 
housing markets, i.e. ( )0>tk , when  
                                               






− +>+ )r(1bqkS
B
1-tt1tt
                                                        (7) 
                                                 
5 Regime (IV: Falling house prices 1+> tt qq  and a negative user cost 01
1 <
+
+ +
r
qq tt  gives 
t
t
q
qr 11 +<+ , which 
is impossible when the interest rate is positive.    
 8 
As savings plus the value of existing housing capital exceeds interest payments and loan 
repayment, the household is in a net-asset position.  
 
In these regimes the expected appreciation of collateral values and mortgage return in 
case of default is lower than its alternative. Mortgagees are hence not involved in search-
for-yield behaviour. Due to asymmetric information mortgagees pledge down-payments 
by mortgagors and are not willing to accept 100 percent LTV-ratios. Hence, only 
households who are able to fulfil the necessary down-payment constraint are allowed to 
become owners.   
 
Regime (III) on the other hand refers to as a situation with strong house price growth. It 
is characterised by house price growth 1+< tt qq  and a negative user cost of housing 
0
1
1 <





+
− +
r
qq tt . The combined constraint equals: ( )
t
t
q
qr 11 +<+ . As the mortgage return 
exceeds its alternative, the incentives for search-for-yield are present.    
 
Reversing expression (7) shows that when the user cost is negative a household is 
allowed to enter housing markets, i.e. a sufficient condition for ( )0>tk , even when it is 
in a net-debt position. Search-for-yield makes mortgagees willing to supply mortgages 
even if households not are able to fulfil any down-payment constraints. Hence, as new 
groups of households are allowed to move into owner-occupation strong house price 
growth is accompanied by 100 percent LTV-ratios.   
 
5. Summary and discussion  
This paper comments on mortgage procyclicality and illustrates the context specific 
nature of financial accelerators in housing markets. Stated differently, the conditions for 
when the two offsetting financial sector components dominates mortgage policy, are 
derived. A model that highlights the alternative return to mortgages, the user cost of 
housing, and adaptive expectations is applied to analyse credit constrained households 
housing demand. As the down-payment constraint is determined by the capital gains of 
owner-occupation, the model implicitly argues the importance of debt-servicing ability in 
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the credit risk assessments of mortgagees in order to reduce mortgage procyclicality. The 
mortgage structures accompanying the down-payment constraint is related to the relative 
rate of return and the incentives for search-for-yield behaviour among mortgagees.   
 
Separated by the user cost and house price growth four regimes are derived for credit 
constrained household’s housing market adaption when mortgagees risk assessments are 
influenced by market conditions. Search-for-yield may allow the positive collateral effect 
of rising house prices to dominate the accompanying negative debt-to-income effect, and 
bring new socio-economic groups into owner-occupation when house price growth is 
strong. As households in net-debt positions are allowed to become owners, the 
conventional down-payment constraint disappears and mortgagees accept 100 percent 
LTV-ratios. This increases housing market risk in accordance with the deviation 
hypothesis, see again Koetter and Poghosyan (2009).   
 
The potential for regime shifts in the relation between housing and mortgage markets 
shows how significant changes in monetary or credit policy might have fundamental 
implications for housing markets. As an example figure (1) summarises the main 
differences between regime (I) and regime (III). 
 
When house price growth is strong, the behaviour of mortgagees is driven by search-for-
yield. The down-payment constraint that usually accompany asymmetric information in 
credit markets disappear. As mortgagees accept 100 percent LTV-ratios, households in 
net-debt positions are allowed to enter owner-occupation. Through moral hazard and 
adverse selection house price growth might increase mortgage portfolio risk. When house 
prices grow at a slower rate, a household must be in a net-asset position and be able to 
fulfil the down-payment constraint in order to become owner. Now, the collateral effect 
dominates the financial accelerator. 
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                                                        Figure 1: House price growth and mortgage regimes  
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Figure 1 illustrates how both monetary policy and mortgage market developments might 
serve as potential sources of regime shifts. A substantial reduction in the interest rate 
might for instance change the relation between housing and mortgage markets from a 
situation where mortgagees demand down-payments and focus on the debt-servicing 
ability of households, into one where search-for-yield suppress the socio-economic 
characteristics of a mortgage seeker in favour of expected collateral gains in its mortgage 
portfolio and future lending, in search of a nominal return target.  Increased competition 
for mortgage market shares might have the same effect. 
 
The regime shifts can be derived on the basis of herding, over-optimism, weak 
institutional memory, reductions in market discipline or supervisory toughness. 
Implicitly, the paper argues for the importance of incorporating debt-servicing ability in 
mortgage policy in order to avoid procyclicality. This can either be ensured through 
internal mortgage guidelines, market discipline or supervisory measures.      
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